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TO LIVE OUTSIDE THE LAW
YOU MUST BE HONEST:
BRAM FISCHER AND THE
MEANING OF INTEGRITY*
STEPHEN ELLMANN**

ABSTRACT
It is often suggested that anti-apartheid South Africans' use of the old order's courts in
the course of their struggle contributed to the new South Africa's commitment to the
rule of law. At the same time, it is widely felt that apartheid South Africa's laws were
so illegitimate that moral citizens were not obliged to obey them, and indeed were
entitled to take up arms against them. Could a lawyer who chose to break the law at
the same time contribute to the ideal of the rule of law? Bram Fischer, whose life has
recently been compellingly recounted in a full-length biography by Stephen Clingman,
followed a moral path that eventually brought his ethical duty as a lawyer and his
moral duty to end apartheid into conflict, and in the end chose to breach his duties as
a lawyer in order to meet his responsibility as a human being. This article argues that
although it is impossible to know with certainty how Fischer's choices affected other
anti-apartheid lawyers, or how those other lawyers' choices to obey or disobey the law
affected the strength of the rule of law in post-apartheid South Africa, still we have
reason to think that his example taught the ultimate importance of achieving a legal
system to which men and women, black and white, could be faithful. Fischer's
honesty, his commitment to principle, even as he broke the law resonates across the
decades that have passed since he made his choices.

*

'[T]o live outside the law, you must be honest' is from Bob Dylan, 'Absolutely Sweet Marie' on

Blonde on Blonde (Sony/Columbia Records 1966). Thanks to my colleague Michael Perlin for
the citation and discussion of Dylan's meaning.
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who organised the Symposium for all their work to make the Symposium a pleasure to be a
part of. In addition, I appreciate the comments of George Bizos, Geoff Budlender, Arthur
Chaskalson, Stephen Clingman, Robert Condlin, Tom Karis, Louis Raveson, Nancy
Rosenbloom, Abbe Smith, Stuart Woolman and the students in Professor Woolman's class
at Columbia Law School, with whom I discussed these issues, as well as the participants in
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referees for this journal. Responsibility for the views expressed here, however, is solely my own.
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(with some revisions) with the kind permission of the editors of that journal. I hope that South
African readers will indulge the occasional exposition of facts which are common knowledge

here, but not in the United States.

BRAM FISCHER AND THE MEANING OF INTEGRITY

Bram Fischer could 'charm the birds out of the trees'. 1 He was beloved
by many, respected by his colleagues at the bar and even by political
enemies. 2 He was an expert on gold law and water rights, represented Sir
Ernest Oppenheimer, the most prominent capitalist in the land, and was
appointed a King's Counsel by the National Party government, which
was simultaneously shaping the system of apartheid. 3 He was also a
Communist, who died under sentence of life imprisonment.
Responding to his introduction at the From Apartheid to Democracy in
South Africa Symposium, Justice Albie Sachs 4 resisted the notion of
'heroes,' but Bram Fischer was surely heroic. Yet it is no exaggeration to
say that during his life Bram Fischer, this most respected of lawyers,
violated many laws, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly. I want to
tell this aspect of Fischer's story in some detail, not to impugn his
memory, but rather in the hope of understanding the moral decisions
faced by a lawyer of both great integrity and passionate opposition to
apartheid during the long decades of that oppressive system. I never had
the honour of knowing Bram Fischer, but I have had the great fortune to
know some South African lawyers for fifteen years now, and I have been
impressed by their courage and integrity, which I rather think owe
something to Fischer's legacy. While the choices he made were his
choices, and represent only one of the ways that lawyers honourably
responded to the evil of apartheid, in speaking about Fischer I seek to
speak about the meaning of integrity in a world where integrity and
justice are surrounded and beset by evil. That was the world of South
Africa over much of the last fifty years, but of course not a world whose
boundaries were ever confined to South Africa's.
Let me add one more word before I begin. I could not have written this
essay if I did not have on my desk the extraordinary and definitive
biography of Bram Fischer by Stephen Clingman. 5 Clingman's concern is
with Fischer's life as a whole, rather than the particular dilemmas Fischer
faced as a lawyer. My concerns begin with those lawyer's dilemmas,
though ultimately I too want to speak of Fischer's life and heart. In doing
so, to a very large extent I am reading Stephen Clingman and through
him, I hope, Bram Fischer.
I

ANTI-APARTHEID LAWYERING AND THE LAW

While South African lawyers who opposed apartheid knew that they
faced great obstacles in the cases they brought and defended against the
1 S Clingman Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary (1998) 175 (quoting South African attorney
Charlie Johnson).
2 Ibid 117, 163, 230.
3 Ibid 117, 195, 217, 289.
4 Justice Albie Sachs is a member of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and a man who,
like Bram Fischer, endured a great deal in the struggle against apartheid. After detention
without trial and exile, he lost an arm when South African agents bombed his car on 7 April
1988. A Sachs The Soft Vengeance of a Freedom Fighter 2 ed (2000) 51.
5 Clingman (note 1 above).
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state, they - or at least many of them, black and white - continued to
work within the legal system to obtain there what victories they could. In
many ways, therefore, they embraced a strategy of playing within the
rules. But this decision by no means reflected any concession that the
system was actually a just one. For many of these lawyers, this choice was
accompanied by other choices, choices that involved at least some
violations of the law. Brain Fischer followed this path especially far, but
many other lawyers walked it as well.
Indeed, for many black South African lawyers, lawbreaking was
almost the first step in their practice of the profession. Under apartheid
laws, black lawyers were prohibited from setting up offices in the
downtown areas where the courts were located without special
government permits. Nelson Mandela, for example, tells us in his
autobiography that, in the early 1950s, '[t]he authorities refused to renew'
the permit that temporarily had allowed Mandela and his partner, Oliver
Tambo, to set up an office in Johannesburg. 6 They 'insist[ed] that we
move our offices to an African location many miles away and virtually
unreachable for our clients. We interpreted this as an effort by the
authorities to put us out of business, and occupied our premises illegally,
with threats of eviction constantly hanging over our heads.' 7 In Kenneth
Broun's unique and illuminating book, 8 which we rightly celebrated at
the From Apartheid to Democracy Symposium, Dullah Omar, later the
Minister of Justice in the first post-apartheid government, remembers
starting an illegal partnership with an African lawyer:
I filled in my application forms. I lied about our relationship, and I said he was working
for me. I lied under oath about a number of things. 1, too, had to apply for a Group
Areas permit because I could not practice in the city without a permit. So we had to tell a
few lies on my permit as well. 9

Similarly, Ismail Mahomed, the late Chief Justice of South Africa's
Supreme Court of Appeal, told Broun that he could not legally have
chambers as an advocate in Johannesburg. Camping in sympathetic
colleagues' offices for years, 10 Mahomed and the lawyers whose offices
he used may all have violated the law. Some years later, Dikgang
Moseneke, who would one day play an important part in South Africa's
peaceful transition to democracy, hoped that he and his partners would
be charged for setting up their office despite the law. At the time they
thought:

6 N Mandela Long Walk to Freedom (1995) 151.

7 Ibid 132.
8 KS Broun Black Lawyers, White Courts: The Soul of South African Law (2000).
9 Ibid 224.
10 Ibid 162-64. Mahomed's situation was not unique. George Bizos has pointed out, in a personal
communication to me, that '[t]he Johannesburg Bar Council itself defied the law by arranging
with [Bizos] to share Chambers with Duma Nokwe between 1956 and 1962.' See I Maisels AA
Life at Law (1998) 72-74.
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'There will be a hell of a case. It will be all over in the papers: New Black Law Firm
Resists the Group Areas Act. What more fun can you have than that?' In the end, they
didn't charge us. For some reason they just backed off from charging us. And we were
dying to be charged. "

Another kind of lawbreaking was also far from unknown to South
African lawyers opposed to apartheid. The careers of Nelson Mandela
and Oliver Tambo illustrate this point. These two men, at one time the
partners of the only African law firm in South Africa, 12 were also leaders
of the African National Congress (ANC). In 1953, Nelson Mandela was
the 'volunteer-in-chief for the Defiance Campaign, in which he and
thousands of others committed a range of acts of civil disobedience.
Mandela was convicted for his actions, but a South African judge held
that this was no ground for Mandela to be disbarred. 13 Later, Mandela
went underground and became 'the leader of a nascent guerilla army,' 14
uMkhonto we Sizwe, in effect the military arm of the ANC. 15 Tambo
went into exile and led the ANC from outside South Africa for almost
three decades. Probably everything Mandela and Tambo did in those
capacities was illegal.
Brain Fischer also engaged in lawbreaking of this sort. His office was
one of those that Ismail Mohamed used. 16 During and shortly after
World War II, both Fischer and his wife, Molly, took part in Communist
party 'food raids'. In these raids, party members took grocery goods that
the merchants were hoarding or selling at above the prices set by war
regulations and sold them at the lawfully fixed prices. 17 At best this
conduct was of 'marginal legality'. 18 In 1948, Fischer pled guilty to aiding
and abetting an unlawful strike by African miners. 19 Within a few years
of the 1950 ban of the Communist Party, Fischer became part of its
resuscitation as an underground, illegal organisation. 20 In response to
these actions, Bram and Molly Fischer faced constant governmental
pressure throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Bram Fischer was
officially listed as a Communist, both Fischers received banning orders,
11 Clingman (note 1 above) 98.
12 Mandela (note 6 above) 145.
13 See ibid 126-40, 162-63; see IncorporatedLaw Society, Transvaal v Mandela 1954 (3) SA 102

(T).
14 Mandela (note 6 above) 282.
15 Ibid 270-74. 'UMkhonto we Sizwe' means 'The Spear of the Nation'. Ibid 274.

16 Broun (note 8 above) 162-63; Clingman (note 1 above) 348.
17 Clingman (note 1 above) 160, 167.
18 See ibid 167.

19 Ibid 182.
20 It is not clear exactly when Fischer and his wife, Molly, became part of the underground
organisation. Clingman reports, however, that the Party had re-established itself by 1953 (ibid
193), and specifically mentions that, '[gliven the South African Communist Party's recent
reconstitution, it is hard to believe that Molly's trip [to China in 1954] did not have any
clandestine purposes' (ibid 203). Lionel 'Rusty' Bernstein recalls Fischer playing an integral
role in the resuscitation of the Communist Party, apparently beginning in 1951. See R
Bernstein Memory Against Forgetting: Memoirs from a Life in South African Politics 1938

1964 (1999) 114-30.
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and they were subjected to police searches and wiretapping. 21 In 1960,
Molly Fischer, though not her husband, was detained without trial under
a State of Emergency. 22
It is one thing to violate the obviously unjust laws of racial segregation
that blocked black South Africans from practising law, or even to engage
in unlawful political activities 'at night' outside the sphere of legal work.
It is perhaps another matter to violate the law in the course of one's legal
practice itself, for here the grounds for finding an obligation to obey the
law are particularly substantial. 23 This too, however, was not unheard of
in apartheid South Africa, although for obvious reasons it was probably
little spoken of at the time. Dullah Omar told Kenneth Broun that he had
carried messages between prison inmates whom he represented.24 Omar
used his access to the individual inmates as their attorney to pass from
21 Ibid 194, 209-10, 267.
22 Clingman (note 1 above) 265.
23 The possibility that lawyers are specially obliged to obey the rules of their own profession
stems from at least three sources: the oath of admission lawyers take, the daily interactions
lawyers have with each other, and the lawyers' continued participation in the legal system. I
will not explore these moral arguments in detail, but it is important to sketch them briefly.
The oath of admission, whatever its exact language, surely implies to others that the oathtaker will obey the rules that directly govern the lawyer's professional activity. A lawyer might
maintain that an oath calling, say, for fidelity to the Republic of South Africa bound him or
her only to the laws of the just nation that was waiting to be born. (For an example of a
somewhat similar understanding of the oath, see D Dyzenhaus Judging the Judges, Judging
Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the ApartheidLegal Order (1998) 114 (quoting a comment
by a speaker from the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, at the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's hearings on the legal profession).) But unless the lawyer
announced this interpretation, it would no doubt come as a surprise to many other members of
the profession. A lawyer might also maintain that a promise or oath offered to an evil
antagonist had no moral force, but this position seems hard to sustain as a general
proposition. Finally, lawyers might contend that their decision to take the oath of admission
was coerced because they could not otherwise challenge the injustice of apartheid through the
courts. This point has force, but not every lawyer who came to oppose apartheid could really
have said that he or she was 'coerced' into becoming a lawyer.
The daily interactions that lawyers have with each other also may generate moral
obligations. If lawyers and judges tend to trust each other, perhaps warily but still
meaningfully, because of their shared membership in the legal profession and their presumed
adherence to its norms, then each lawyer who receives that professional trust from others while
in fact not living by those norms is engaged in a form of deception. The deception, moreover,
is not abstract, but personal directed at the particular men and women with whom the lawyer
interacts and whose trust he or she seeks to manipulate.
Finally, lawyers' participation in the legal system may also generate moral claims.
Participation may imply some measure of consent, confirming the apparent meaning of the
oath of admission. In addition, participation may sometimes lead to victories, and then the
lawyer who rejects the obligations of the profession is in the position of seeking and obtaining
benefits while refusing to acknowledge reciprocal duties.
I do not mean to suggest that any of these sources of professional obligation generate claims
that always trump the other ethical duties resulting from the right and obligation to oppose
injustice. Moreover, these grounds of professional obligation may have less force in some
contexts than in others; the norms of the courtroom may have more claim on lawyers than those
of the prison, for example, where shared trust and decent treatment may be in scant supply. My
point is only that even in an unjust society where, in general, law does not deserve obedience,
the obligations of the legal profession itself will often still have special, moral weight.
24 Broun (note 8 above) 228.
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one to another what they could not communicate directly. 25 This conduct
clearly violated prison rules. Nelson Mandela confirmed that Robben
Island inmates relied on their lawyers to smuggle letters out of prison '[1]awyers were not searched' - and to carry messages to the ANC in exile
in Lusaka.26
Some lawyers who were also determined political opponents of
apartheid might even have been willing to lie for the sake of their
cause. Godfrey Pitje, who was admitted as an attorney in 1959,
remembered telling the security police that he was not in touch with
Nelson Mandela, who was then underground. In fact Pitje 'used to meet
him [Mandela] in disguise.' 27 Perhaps men and women prepared to take
these steps in their private lives were also prepared to take similar steps as
lawyers: to violate the obligations of legal ethics, and of the criminal law,
in their legal practice. As we shall see, this is the terrain that Bram Fischer
arrived at after a career dedicated to the law.
II

BRAM FISCHER AND THE LAW

Brain Fischer is perhaps best remembered for one remarkable act of
courage and self-sacrifice, which grew out of his own arrest. In June 1964,
Fischer had finished his work as lead counsel for Nelson Mandela and
the other leaders of uMkhonto we Sizwe at the Rivonia trial. The trial
ended with sentences of life imprisonment, an outcome that was seen as a
victory against the possibility of the death penalty. 28 This victory
preserved the lives of Mandela and his co-defendants, and made it
possible for them eventually to return to the stage of South African and
world history. Just three months after the trial, in September 1964,
Fischer himself was arrested and charged with Communist activities. 29
He applied for bail. A co-defendant, who had faced charges twice before
and not fled, was denied bail, while Fischer's request was granted. 30 Bail
enabled him not only to leave jail, but also, as the magistrate granting it
understood, to leave the country; and leave the country he did. 31
Two details of this story are important here. First, the legal profession
supported Fischer's application for bail with great intensity. One lawyer
25 Ibid.
26 Mandela (note 6 above) 421.

27 Broun (note 8 above) 21.
28 Clingman (note 1 above) 319-22. Walter Sisulu, perhaps Mandela's closest comrade, said of
this verdict: 'Our Movement should have been broken, without leaders and without hope. But

instead it was alive, singing, marching in procession right there around the court, with ANC
colours flying. It was not just our celebration, but had become a world celebration with ANC
colours waving. We were expecting death and now we were all alive preparing for the next

phase of the struggle... . Now we were a central part of a worldwide movement.' W Sisulu I
Will Go Singing (2001) 150-51 (an interview/biography of Sisulu, '[i]n conversation with
George M. Houser and Herbert Shore') (punctuation modified).
29 Clingman (note 1 above) 337, 348.
30 Ibid 338-39.
31 Ibid 339-40.
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named Rissik, who ultimately put up the substantial bail himself,
testified, as Clingman writes, that 'he was prepared to underwrite Brain's
bail for any amount: "I have absolute faith in his integrity. I would accept
his word unhesitatingly, confident that he would carry it out."' 32 Second,
Fischer did not leave the country to escape trial, although it is
conceivable that the government hoped he would depart the scene for
exile. 33 Rather, Fischer left South Africa to argue an appeal before the
British Privy Council on behalf of a Rhodesian manufacturing
company. 34 Throughout much of his career, Fischer was on retainer to
some of South Africa's largest companies, just as he was almost always
on the Johannesburg Bar Council, the governing body of advocates. 35 He
was at the center of South Africa's legal elite. Indeed, he had practically
been born to the role - his father became the Judge President of the
Orange Free State division of the Supreme Court, one level below the
highest South African court of his time. 36 From his arrival in
Johannesburg to begin his law practice, Fischer 'almost in some preassigned way ... became ensconced among the Bar's elite social circle'. 37
When he applied for his passport, which was suddenly approved just
before his arrest, 38 Fischer 'conveyed a message to the Minister via the
chairman of the [Bar] Council that he would refrain from political
activity in England'. 39 He perhaps violated this promise, since he met
with the Communist Party in exile precisely to discuss whether he should
return to South Africa. Fischer did, however, argue his case before the
Privy Council as planned (and won it), and then returned home to face
trial. 4o Up to this point, Fischer's story is more or less that of a favoured
son of the Afrikaner establishment, unaccountably gone astray, but still
ultimately staying within the rules.
That soon ceased to be true. After his trial resumed, Fischer estreated,
or, to use cruder American language, jumped bail. Rissik was repaid the
bail money he had put forward, 4 1 but Fischer had still unmistakably
violated his implicit, and arguably express, undertaking to the court that
he would stand trial. 42 Harold Hanson, Fischer's lawyer, read out to the
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

Ibid 339 (quoting Peter Ulrich Rissik).
Ibid 340.
Ibid 337.
See notes 2-3 above and accompanying text.
Clingman (note 1 above) 334.
Ibid 108.
Ibid 337-38.
Ibid 370. He later maintained that this statement bore on the grant of his passport, but not his
getting bail. Ibid.
40 Ibid 342-46.
41 Ibid 358.
42 At his bail hearing, Fischer testified: 'I have no intention of avoiding a political prosecution. I
fully believe I can establish my innocence. I am an Afrikaner. My home is South Africa. I will
not leave South Africa because my political beliefs conflict with those of the Government
ruling the country' (ibid 338). Even if this declaration falls short of a promise to stand trial to
the end, as distinguished from a promise only to return to South Africa (as Clingman suggests,
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court a letter that he said was delivered to him that day. 43 In the letter
Fischer told Hanson, 'I wish you to inform the Court that my absence,
44
though deliberate, is not intended in any way to be disrespectful.'
Instead, he explained his reasons for believing his action was morally
required, and concluded by saying: 'I can no longer serve justice in the
way I have attempted to do during the past thirty years. I can do it only
in the way I have now chosen.' 45 Despite the certainty that his actions
would subject him to harsher criminal charges and longer punishment if
he were caught, he saw this step as 'a supreme duty'.4 6 It was a matter of
special anguish to him that, two days after he fled his trial, the
Johannesburg bar, of which he had been so prominent a member, filed
proceedings to strike him from the roll of advocates, or in other words to
disbar him. 47 Fischer was disbarred, by the same judge who had presided
over the Rivonia trial, and his name has never been restored to the roll. 48
No other public step Fischer ever took divided him so totally from the
world to which he had been born. 49 Fischer's 294 days underground were
very difficult. 50 The political work he had hoped to do came to little,
although the symbolic consequences may have been important, in
particular to the Rivonia prisoners on Robben Island. 51 The pain of
hiding and being cut off from most of those whom he knew was acute. 52
After ingeniously transforming his physical appearance, he indiscreetly
resumed contact with people he felt he could not be apart from. 5' Within
the tremendous constraints of secrecy, Fischer was 'surrounded by
women', 54 but he was without his wife, because she had died just after the
Rivonia trial, in a freak automobile accident that took place while
Fischer was driving. 55 His daughters felt that he would never have gone
underground had she been alive, 56 and now he was losing even more.
After he was captured, having failed to act decisively to flee the country
when he might have, 57 Fischer paid the price he had expected: he was

43

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

ibid 370), it is obvious that a criminal defendant seeking bail implicitly represents that he will
continue to attend his trial.
Ibid 355. Hanson was not telling the truth. He had gone to Fischer's house the previous day to
pick up the letter, and Clingman writes that '[i]n fact when Bram told Hanson what he planned
to do, Hanson had said he would do anything to help him' (ibid 364). Hanson's acts surely put
him too in breach of ordinary legal ethics.
Ibid 355.
Ibid 356.
Ibid.
Ibid 368-72, 389-91.
Ibid 389-90, 454.
See ibid 390.
Ibid 401.
Ibid 375-76.
Ibid 379.
Ibid 365-68, 379.
Ibid 379.
Ibid 323-28.
Ibid 357.
Ibid 382, 388, 392, 398-99.
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now tried on more extensive charges than he had confronted at his
original trial, including sabotage. 58 In the end, the price was even worse
than he had anticipated, because he had hoped and even believed that
apartheid would end soon. 59
Fischer was sentenced to life imprisonment. Nine years later he died
after succumbing to cancer, which may have been aggravated by gross
malpractice by his prison doctor. After he died in his brother's house,
legally still a prisoner, his ashes were claimed by the Department of
Prisons. 60 Among the many hardships he endured, perhaps the worst was
the death of his son Paul, who had suffered from cystic fibrosis from
birth. 6 1 Arthur Chaskalson, now the Chief Justice of South Africa's
Constitutional Court, gave the eulogy for Paul because his father was
locked behind prison walls. 62
It is less widely known how far Brain Fischer had departed from the
normal rules of lawyering before he shocked his colleagues at the
Johannesburg bar by fleeing his trial. To understand how far he had
already gone, we need to return to the Rivonia trial, in which Fischer led
the defense of Nelson Mandela and other leaders of uMkhonto we Sizwe.
It was natural that he should be the lead counsel for the accused in this
case, for he was a senior counsel who had helped win the great ANC
Treason Trial only a few years before. 63 But Fischer was reluctant to take
the case. The young lawyers who joined him on the case did not initially
understand why and Fischer evidently did not tell them. It was only in the
course of their case preparation that they examined documents collected
by the prosecution and found Brain Fischer's handwriting on them. 64
Fischer's handwriting was there because, although he 'was never a
member of uMkhonto we Sizwe, ... he was deeply involved65at Rivonia,
attending meetings, discussing policy, drafting documents'.
He was, in other words, probably already a co-conspirator in the case
he was defending. Certainly he was an accessory after the fact, for after
the Rivonia arrests he was personally involved in getting rid of a car that
one of the accused had been using. 66 He also helped another lawyer
involved in uMkhonto's work to flee the country after the lawyer, 'quite
possibly' with Fischer's prior approval, had bribed a guard in order to
successfully escape from jail. 67 He avoided being in court and left some
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Ibid 406.
Ibid 392, 418, 427.
Ibid 432-41.
Ibid 217-18, 427-28.
Ibid 428.
Ibid 301. For more information on Fischer's role in the Treason Trial of the 1950s, see ibid
228-64.
Ibid 304-05.
Ibid 287.
Ibid 293. The car needed to be disposed of to prevent its being discovered at a cottage being
used as a 'safe haven' (ibid).
Ibid 295.
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early witnesses for his co-counsel, purportedly on the ground that he had
to handle another case; actually, these witnesses could have identified him
as a visitor to the uMkhonto headquarters in Rivonia. Even so, he wound
up cross-examining another witness who, as Clingman writes, at any
moment could have answered: 'But you know about this, Brain, because
you were at the meeting.' 68 On one occasion in court, the prosecutor
offered into evidence a document with handwriting on it, and the writing
was identified as belonging to the brother-in-law of one of the accused.
Fischer looked at it, didn't blink, and passed it to his co-counsel. No
doubt they did their best not to blink too - but the handwriting belonged
to Fischer. 69
Obviously, these acts took Fischer some distance from conventional
legal ethics. He did no injustice to his clients; they knew where matters
stood and admired his bravery in taking the case. 70 But when a lawyer, in
the course of defending his clients, faces evidence that actually implicates
him, he has what in normal circumstances would be seen as a conflict of
interest. When a lawyer cannot tell his co-counsel that he is himself at
peril in the case they are working on, we would ordinarily say that he has
also, in some sense, breached faith with them and perhaps endangered the
effectiveness of their work.
Fischer's clearest departure from the world of ordinary legal
obligation, however, took another form. Here is Stephen Clingman's
description:
UMkhonto we Sizwe had been all but destroyed at Rivonia, and it was necessary to
reconstitute it, even if in minimal form: this occurred while the Rivonia Trial proceeded.
A new National High Command was established: Wilton Mkwayi was seconded from the
ANC, and Dave Kitson from the Communist Party; they were joined by a comrade called
Chiba. Following precepts all the more stringent now, each of them had to cease active
membership within his home organisation, but at the same time there had to be links.
Accordingly, Brain Fischer became Dave Kitson's liaison with the Communist Party, and
they kept up regular contact.... Brain brought Kitson money in large amounts,
smuggled in from overseas, and fairly soon, Kitson recalled, they had reactivated the
uMkhonto structures, with some 600 members in the Transvaal alone, as well as
acquiring cars, vans and other equipment.
Brain also brought along exhibits from the trial, now a repository that was proving
surprisingly useful. For handed in among all the documents were maps of likely targets
for sabotage, as well as plans for blowing them up - and Brain gave them to Kitson to
pore over. Perhaps, given the machinations of the prosecution, Brain took the dry view
that documents, once submitted as exhibits, were in the public domain; or he may have
been able, to this extent, to separate his various commitments and responsibilities in
competing areas of his life. Still, there was a certain flagrancy, if not an outright
contradiction of his normal fealty to the ethics of the court. Brain was not so naive after
all: with the trial on in full force, and under the fierce onslaught of the state, there was no
need to retain an absolute purity; legal imperatives had been subordinated to the
political.... As long as the trial proceeded there was a moratorium on all sabotage
68 Ibid 304, 312.
69 Ibid 305.
70 Ibid 304.
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activity (it was crucial to avoid any provocation that might reinforce the possibility of
death sentences), and other organisations observed the moratorium as well. But as soon
as it ended the new leadership clearly had it in mind to re-initiate their campaign. Even
some of the accused, remarked Kitson, relayed suggestions via Bram of what to blow up
and how. 71

This is a remarkable passage. Assuming the recollections on which it is
based were accurate, Bram Fischer, while defending the Rivonia accused
against charges of sabotage, was in fact conspiring to commit more
sabotage. He conspired with the defendants in his case to continue
committing the crimes for which they were on trial. He took advantage of
his access to the accused in jail to relay information that would further
this conspiracy. And he used documents to which he had easy access, due
to his position in the case, to promote these same crimes. 72 It must be
said, in light of these acts, that when Fischer later told the Court that he
had absented himself from his trial because he could no longer serve
justice in the way he had for the past thirty years, 73 he was not being
altogether candid. He had already stopped trying to serve justice within
the bounds of the law, and was already trying to serve justice in quite
another way, by becoming what might be called a guerrilla or a spy
within the legal system.
III

INTEGRITY AND LAW BREAKING

We might ask, in response to all this, whether Bram Fischer's conduct
was justified. For those who are convinced that violent action, even
violent action directed only against property, 74 is never a just response to
oppression, his actions were wrong. For those who accept the legitimacy
of violence as a tool to end intolerable abuse when other means have
failed - and anyone who considers the American revolution or the
Union's military struggle in the Civil War justified is such a person - it is
evident that violence was a justifiable response to the stunning oppression
of apartheid South Africa. Whether violence was the wisest course of
71 Ibid 310-11. This and all other excerpts from S Clingman Brain Fischer: Afrikaner
Revolutionary (copyright c©1998 by Stephen Clingman) are reprinted by permission of the
publisher, the University of Massachusetts Press.
72 Ibid. Clingman mentions that another lawyer and Communist 'had given evidence (under
instruction from Bram) when subpoenaed in the Rivonia Trial' (ibid 366). It is not clear from
this brief reference whether Fischer influenced this lawyer's testimony in ways that would have
been unlawful. When Fischer himself was tried, however, he smuggled messages to a jailed
former Communist Party colleague, Piet Beyleveld, who was preparing to testify against him.
Fischer wrote to 'Beyleveld that the threat of ten years [imprisonment] meant nothing, and
that he must not give evidence under any circumstances' (ibid 349). Bernstein appears to
assume that Fischer urged a potential witness against the Rivonia accused, Bob Hepple, to flee
the country after Hepple's release from detention. Hepple did escape. Bernstein (note 20
above) 293, 296.
73 Clingman (note 1 above) 356.
74 In 'the first stage of armed struggle, uMkhonto took care to avoid any loss of life' (ibid 280).
Even in 1963, at the time of the Rivonia arrests, uMkhonto apparently had not yet embraced
'guerrilla warfare' (ibid 300, 312-13), although Umkhonto's leadership may have been pressing
the ANC and the Communist Party to approve this step. Bernstein (note 20 above) 249-52.
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action can still be debated, but, even if it was not the best strategy, it was
surely a justifiable choice.
Once it is accepted that lives could ethically be taken in the struggle
against apartheid, it might seem difficult to muster an argument that the
rules of legal ethics could not be violated. Breaching the rules of legal
ethics may be a form of lying and a violation of the promise of obedience
entailed in the oath of admission.7 5 Lies and breaches of promise,
however, are not such grave acts as killing. The greater includes the
lesser, and if killing was justified, so was Fischer's departure from legal
ethics.
But this is too neat. Killing may not always be worse than breaking
faith. The soldier who kills an enemy soldier in the heat of battle may
have less to answer for than the spy who takes advantage of human trust
to steal military secrets. A lawyer trusted implicitly by his professional
colleagues breaks faith with many people in a way that the rifleman does
not. Spies are rarely held in high esteem, because they live a life of
falsehood, and we are in some ways more troubled by that than by frank,
lethal contest.
There might be two other costs of making this choice. First, following
Fischer's path risked sacrificing whatever gains could be won in the
South African courts. I have argued elsewhere that these gains, from
outright courtroom victories to valuable opportunities to address a
watching world, were real. 76 Obviously any lawyer who went as far as
Fischer was abandoning his legal career and thus his chance to contribute
to the anti-apartheid movement as a lawyer. But even if lawyers followed
Fischer only part of the way - by breaking the rules of ethics when they
saw that as necessary, but always trying to escape detection - they risked
not only personal disaster, but also the gradual deterioration of the
perception of anti-apartheid lawyers as fellow members of the legal
fraternity. That perception may have protected and encouraged antiapartheid legal advocacy by lending it the mantle of the traditions of the
bar, and forfeiting this mantle might have had profound costs. In the end,
however, while anti-apartheid lawyers may in fact have come under some
suspicion, 7 7 my sense is that they did not forfeit the credibility and
leverage they had as legal professionals. Whether this was because they
scrupulously and consistently adhered to the rules of the game, or

75 See note 23 above and accompanying text.
76 S Ellmann In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency (1992)
248-74.
77 In 1987, the Appellate Division (then South Africa's highest court) upheld a state of
emergency regulation barring emergency detainees from access to their lawyers (except with
government permission). The court rejected an argument that the possibility of adopting caseby-case measures to avoid the 'security risks arising from contact between a detainee and his
legal adviser' made the regulations' broad-brush approach so unreasonable as to be beyond
the state's authority (Omar v Minister of Law and Order; Fani v Minister of Law and Order;
State President v Bill 1987 (3) SA 857 (A) 859). See Ellmann (note 76 above) 94-97.
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because their departures from the rules did not become widely known,
ultimately this first concern is not an acute one.
The second cost raises a longer-range issue. When wars end, armies are
demobilised or even merged, as in South Africa today. Courts may be
another matter. If they have been used as mere tools by all those
concerned - with judges being told how to rule by the government,
prosecutors working in league with brutal security police, and defense
counsel and defendants lying and cheating whenever they could get away
with it - then which institutions will provide justice after the struggle is
over? Kenneth Broun suggests, as have others (including me), that the
remarkable struggle by black and white lawyers to extract justice from
the courts of apartheid South Africa taught those involved in the struggle
the value of the rule of law and helped make South Africa a country
governed by law today. 78 But if Brain Fischer, the paragon of antiapartheid lawyers, was actually engaged in breaking the law, in court,
with his clients, what could any of them have learned, or later taught,
about the rule of law?
Even if lawbreaking by anti-apartheid lawyers did undercut the hold of
the rule of law on South African life, it might have been justified.
Certainly the possible acts of these lawyers were far less egregious
assaults on the rule of law than the ferocious violations of legal order
committed by apartheid's supporters. 79 What harm these lawyers may
have done, moreover, might well be outweighed by the contributions they
made to the ultimate victory over apartheid, perhaps precisely by virtue
of law-breaking in the service of the struggle. But the moral calculations
that these suggestions point to may not have to be undertaken; we must
first try to measure whether some harm was actually done to the rule of
law.
I will not immediately answer these questions of the moral significance
of breaking faith, and its long-term impact on the rule of law. Instead, I
want to pose another question: How did Brain Fischer come to do these
things? I don't mean by this to ask another question, which one might
utter in tones of outrage: 'How could Brain Fischer have done these
things?' The ferocity of apartheid explains, as an intellectual matter, how
a lawyer could come to believe that obedience to the law was impossible.
Nelson Mandela and others reached similar conclusions. What I want to
ask, rather, is how Brain Fischer in particular came to take the steps he
did. When we understand better who Brain Fischer was, we will be in a
better position to return to the larger moral questions that I have left
unresolved for now.
78 Broun (note 8 above) 255-56; Ellmann (note 76 above) 266-67. Dikgang Moseneke makes a
similar point in Broun (note 8 above) 108-09.
79 South Africa has struggled to identify and respond to the stunning violence of apartheid (and
sometimes of its opponents) through the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
For a wrenching and moving account of this Commission's efforts, see A Krog Country of My
Skull. Guilt, Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (1999).
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Let me start this way. Bram Fischer was 'to the manor born.' He was a
member of the Afrikaner elite and the grandson of Abraham Fischer, an
Afrikaner leader during the years of resistance to the British and
afterwards. 80 He was the son of Percy Fischer, who would become the
Judge President of the Orange Free State division of the South African
Supreme Court. 81 He was an outstanding athlete, a Rhodes Scholar, and
someone who might easily have lived a life of privilege and power. 82
Fischer had an ease that reflected the confidence such an upbringing
could produce. 83 Yet he seems also to have had the anxiety that such an
upbringing could produce too, the nagging doubt that he was really all
that he wanted to seem. 84 Moreover, Brain Fischer came from a very
unusual elite - an elite that had known bitter defeat in the Boer War and
in an abortive Afrikaner rebellion during World War I, an elite with a
tradition of resistance. 85 He was a person who could see grandeur in
what the world might call ignominy.
Fischer was also an utterly charming man. In the words of Ismail
Mahomed, Bram Fischer 'was gifted with a personality which conquered
all who had the privilege to know him', reflected in 'a dignity and a
courtesy which was unfailing, an integrity which was unbending, a
warmth and a gentility which was rich and infectious.' 86 He respected
others, was slow to condemn anyone, 87 and built connections all
around. 88 The Fischer home was filled with guests; their parties were
key events in the social life of the left. The swimming pool at their home,
perhaps built first to help combat the young Paul Fischer's cystic fibrosis,
became an oasis of interracial harmony in the midst of apartheid. 89 When
his underground Communist colleagues were urgently consumed with
issues of tactics and manoeuvre, Fischer's focus seemed rather to be on

80 See Clingman (note 1 above) 6-28.
81 Ibid 334.
82 Ibid 40, 67-68 (detailing Fischer's athleticism); 101 (noting his success as a Rhodes Scholar);
48-49, 78-79, 105, 109 (chronicling his early promise).
83 Ibid 39, 58, 97, 109.
84 Ibid 38, 40-41, 107-09, 224, 291.
85 Ibid 29-31.
86 I Mahomed 'The Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture' (1998) 14 SAJHR 209, 209-10.
87 Clingman (note 1 above) 353.
88 Ibid 98-99, 165, 247, 292, 429. In a letter to her husband, Molly Fischer told him, 'Someone
else said that from the time you took over [to argue for the accused in the Treason Trial],
kindliness descended over the whole court!' (ibid 262). After being sentenced to life
imprisonment, '[e]ven across the borderlines of prison enmity Bram managed to make the
kinds of connections that defined him' (ibid 425). Similarly, Hugh Lewin, a fellow prisoner
(and opponent of apartheid), describes Fischer's suffering at the hands of one abusive jailer,
but says that, even with this man, Fischer was 'irrevocably polite and courteous' (H Lewin
Bandiet: Seven Years in a South African Prison 213 (1974)).
89 Ibid 171, 220-21, 224, 252.
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which comrades had which personal problems or needs. 90 Even a state
witness, testifying at Fischer's trial, agreed that Fischer had a 'saint-like
quality'. 91 Arthur Chaskalson wrote recently that 92
Fischer displayed
respect for human dignity 'in every aspect of his life'.
In modern terms, Fischer, though by conviction a very faithful
Communist, may more fundamentally have been responding to his sense
of a web of human connection, a morality more of need and care than of
rules or ineluctable social processes. 93 If this morality of connection is
more characteristic of women than of men, 94 it seems fair to add that
Fischer combined characteristics that might stereotypically be called
masculine and feminine. A quite small man, he was a very good rugby
player, yet surely one of the few rugby players of his day to seriously
contemplate missing a match to attend a garden show. 95 He could also
use his capacity to charm others to his advantage. In cross-examination,
he won admissions from witnesses not by browbeating them, but by
winning them over so fully that they told him things because they wanted
to please him. 96
Fischer was, moreover, a person of overwhelming integrity. This didn't
mean he was '[in]capable of concealment,' 97 at least not by the time he
took the steps I have already described. His cross-examination techniques
suggest a capacity to be strategically charming and self-effacing. So does
a story Clingman repeatedly alludes to, about a tennis match Fischer
played as a young man, in which he lost the first set badly because he
devoted it to feeling out his opponent's weaknesses, and then came back
to take the match. As Clingman puts it, Fischer could be 'disarmingly
congenial'. 98
Fischer's integrity, as his biographer sees it, lay instead in a
determination to achieve consistency in his principles and to realise his
principles in his own life. 99 In a crucial turning point as a young man of
Afrikaner nationalist sentiments and Afrikaner racial prejudices, Fischer
found himself called upon to shake hands with a black man. Clingman
90 Ibid 282-83; see ibid 452 (quoting Joe Slovo - lawyer, Communist, leader of uMkhonto, and
later, Minister of Housing in the first post-apartheid government): '[Fischer] wasn't a
communist in the sense that we used to understand the way a communist operated. And in that
sense he laid the basis for the future.... In his personal relationships with people he had a sort
of humanistic approach to the way people should operate in a political party' (ibid)).
91 Ibid 351.
92 A Chaskalson 'The Third Bram Fischer Lecture: Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of
Our Constitutional Order' (2000) 16 SAJHR 193, 195.
93 See generally C Gilligan In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(1982).
94 For references to the debate on this question, see S Ellmann 'The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for
Lawyers' (1993) 81 Geo LJ 2665, 2665-66 n3.
95 Clingman (note 1 above) 40, 47.
96 Ibid 116, 247-49.
97 Ibid 248.
98 Ibid 249; see ibid 46-47, 423.
99 Ibid 50.
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writes that 'Bram found himself suddenly overcome by an instinctive
feeling of revulsion which he had to force himself to suppress.' 100 More
than thirty years after the fact, Fischer related his feelings about the
incident to the court that was sentencing him. Remembering that he had
grown up with black children as playmates on his farm, he saw 'that it
was I who had changed, and not the black man... I had developed ... an
antagonism for which I could find no rational basis whatsoever.' 101 He
set himself to change, and what he set himself to do he was relentless
about. 102 Perhaps he was all the more relentless because he always
carried within himself the sense that he was not the person he ought to be.
He was immensely loyal as well. 103 Brain Fischer considered family
profoundly important, and his comrades in the Communist Party became
a larger family. 104 He remained a faithful Communist even after
Khruschev revealed some of the truth about Stalin. 105 His biographer
writes that once Fischer committed himself to the woman he later
married, he never wavered. 106 He wrote to her that he would be 'as
honest as it's possible for a human being to be'. 107 And yet, oddly, in
calling Fischer 'unwavering' toward Molly, Clingman seems to overlook
some of the story he himself tells. Long after Fischer and his wife had
professed love for each other, each of them wavered; Fischer himself may
even have become engaged to another woman. 108 Later he said that he
had 'nearly ruined all the future' in the process. 109 Still later, from prison,
Fischer wrote to his daughter Ruth 'that many marriages underwent such
things' as infidelities, and included as examples his own marriage and
that of his parents. 110
100
101
102
103
104

105
106
107
108
109
110

Ibid 51.
Ibid.
See ibid.
Ibid 224.
Ibid 226. Moreover, he shared his political convictions, and to some extent the peril to which
his politics had brought him, with his family members. Molly Fischer was a longtime member
of the party and was detained without trial during the 1960 state of emergency (ibid 265-75).
Their daughter Ilse was also a Communist, and apparently (Clingman does not quite specify
the chronology) her father 'brought her on to the central committee' while he was a fugitive
(ibid 397). Ilse also drove the car while her father hid on the floor, when he fled from their
family home to begin his months underground (ibid 362-65). Other members of the Fischer
family, without necessarily sharing all of Bram Fischer's beliefs, assisted him in hiding
information or delivering clandestine messages. See ibid 326-27, 329, 357. To share peril with
one's family may seem startling, but, as Clingman observes, Fischer was always pragmatic
(ibid 357). It seems right to say that his loyalty to his family was one that encompassed them
in his world, rather than trying to shield them from it. In somewhat the same way, Brain and
Molly Fischer regarded their ill son Paul's 'sense of independence as having as absolute a
value as his health', and 'they had long decided that part of Paul's normality had to be the
moral and political engagement of his parents' (ibid 272).
Ibid 211-13. Even in prison 'Bram would brook little criticism of the Soviet Union' (ibid 424).
Ibid 60.
Ibid 94.
Ibid 103, 112.
Ibid 103.
Ibid 431.
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Whatever Fischer might have actually had in mind as he wrote this
letter to a daughter in anguish, it is not startling that even as strong a
marriage as Brain and Molly Fischer's could have had human
weaknesses. But Brain Fischer judged his own weaknesses rigorously.
Did he not, perhaps, worry that his loyalty to his comrades in the antiapartheid struggle would be equally incomplete? Or that he might not live
up to the saint-like image others had of him? 'Fuck my career,' he said as
he contemplated returning to South Africa to face trial and going
underground,1 11 but this comment sounds more desperate than saintly. A
similar hint of uncertainty and anguish emerges in Fischer's explanation
of his decision to go underground, in his first letter to his daughter Ilse
from hiding: 'I suppose 12
it was worth doing - at any rate, I felt I just had
to, and that was that.' 1
Brain Fischer was also a believer, not in God, but in theories. 113 He
was much taken with a theory of physical and mental conditioning that
his physician brothers viewed as preposterous; they took his engagement
with it as a sign of his naivet6. 114 He was no less taken with scientific
explanations of history, which he began mentioning as much as twenty
years before he finally joined the Communist Party. 11 5 When he visited
the Soviet Union in the 1930s, he saw railway stations filled with peasants
and thought this was proof of the lazy peasant mentality that
Communism was combating. In fact, the peasants were fleeing the
famine to which Stalin had subjected them. 116 As World War II
approached, Fischer was able to maintain that the victims of Stalin's
show trials were actually guilty. 117 Various observers, Nelson Mandela
and Fischer's own daughter Ruth among them, felt that Fischer the
person was greater than his Communist ideology, but he himself adhered
to the party line. 118 He may not have been terribly good at tolerating
uncertainty; his strength was relentless systematising. In the face of
intensifying repression by the National Party in the 1950s and 1960s,
Fischer's need to hold onto his ideological and human commitments may
have intensified. 119 In prison debates (like Nelson Mandela, Fischer
became an eminent figure among his fellow political prisoners) he took
the position, perhaps surprising for a lawyer, 'that conceptual terms

111 Ibid 341. In any event, he knew that the government planned to ban Communists from
practicing law, so 'he had little prospect of anything, by way of a legal career, to protect' (ibid
342).
112 Ibid 382.
113 Ibid 27.

114 Ibid 228-29.
115 Ibid 59, 92.

116 Ibid 81.
117 Ibid 150.
118 Ibid 190, 291.
119 See ibid 212.
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Clingman notes, 'that, after all, was
could have only one meaning'. 120 1As
21
how he had lived his whole life.'
Finally, he had seen a lot of history. He was the child of a family that
sought to bridge the great divide of white South Africa, the gap between
Afrikaner and English. 122 He was in Europe in the years when fascism
was building towards war. 123 Then he returned to South Africa and was
present during the step-by-step escalation of oppression by his fellow
Afrikaners in the National Party, a resurgence with overtones of
fascism. 124 Democratic and nonviolent means of resistance had been
tried for years, but the state's oppression was worse, not better. 125 The
legislation outlawing the Communist Party had been enacted in 1950,126
and after the Sharpeville massacre of black demonstrators in 1960, the
state banned the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups. 127 Many of his
comrades, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, were in
prison. 128 Mandela, Sisulu and no doubt others had endured the risks
and deprivations involved in leading a life underground. 129 If Africans
were to suffer this way, how could Fischer hold himself back? Especially
if, in some part of himself, he feared that he might not have the courage
and commitment he owed to his moral family? As Clingman writes, after
Fischer was captured, George Bizos, a close colleague and himself a
dedicated anti-apartheid lawyer, asked Fischer if it had been
worth sacrificing his family, his profession and everything else? Bram's response was
again angry and clear-cut. He wanted to know if George had asked Nelson Mandela that
question: didn't Nelson have a practice and a family? George confessed that he had not
asked Mandela. 'Well then, don't ask me,' Brain replied. 130
120 Ibid 423. On Fischer's leadership role in prison, see note 137 below.
121 Clingman (note 1 above) 423.
122 Fischer's father and grandfather both were part of Afrikaner struggles against the British. See
notes 80-85 above and accompanying text. But Fischer's grandfather, Abraham, married a
woman whose native language was English, named Brain's father Percy, and advised Percy to
stay in college in Cambridge, England during the Boer War (ibid 9, 15). Percy in turn married
a woman who spoke no Afrikaans (ibid 33). In their home, the children spoke English with
their mother and Afrikaans with their father (ibid).
123 Ibid 87-93.
124 Ibid 92. See also D Harrison The White Tribe of Africa (1985) 117-30 (examining the proGerman and pro-Nazi sympathies of many Afrikaner nationalists during World War II).
Clingman emphasises Fischer's dismay that an Afrikaner 'had caved in' quickly and become
a witness against him at his trial; '[s]urely,' Clingman writes, 'it was now up to at least one
Afrikaner to prove his good faith.' Fischer did that by going underground (Clingman (note 1
above) 353).
125 Clingman (note 1 above) 253-54, 264, 278-79.
126 Ibid 185.
127 Ibid 185-88, 253. See also J Dugard Human Rights and the South African Legal Order (1978)
163-64.
128 See Mandela (note 6 above) 372-378.
129 Ibid 265-318; Sisulu (note 28 above) 81, 235.
130 Clingman (note 1 above) 401. Geoff Budlender has emphasised that Fischer's response is an
expression of his solidarity with African victims of apartheid. G Budlender 'Book Review'
(1999) 15 SAJHR 413, 415. Yet it is also, interestingly, not an answer to Bizos's question. Did
Fischer, on that terrible day, feel more certain of his commitment than of the value of his
sacrifice?
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So this is how Bram Fischer came to violate his obligations as a lawyer.
To become a just person, he committed himself to the political struggle
against apartheid, to the ideological tenets of Communism, and to the
personal bonds he shared with his comrades. He took these commitments
very, very seriously. Throughout his years of political action, Fischer
never permitted himself to shirk duties that others were performing, from
selling subscriptions to the Communist Party paper to meeting with his
underground colleagues while maintaining an above-ground existence as
a lawyer. 131 He hardened in the struggle. 132
For many years, Fischer led two lives simultaneously - a life of
professional achievement, elite status, and powerful corporate clients,
meshed imperfectly but tenably with a life of radical political struggle. At
home he and Molly took a black child into their household; yet they also
had black servants, including the aunt of the little girl whom they had
taken into their home almost as a member of their family. 133 Clingman
writes that the grace with which Fischer could join his different lives was
part of the promise he represented to those who knew him. 134 His
communism was a communism of unification. 135 In prison later, Fischer
insisted on maintaining contact even with a fellow prisoner who was
clearly 'dangerous, lashing out at his co-prisoners, alternately betraying
them and trying to win their confidence'. 136 Fischer 137
felt that 'they could
not be responsible for driving a man into madness.'
But the country hardened alongside Fischer and the space within which
it was possible to lead two such different lives contracted. Fischer could
not withhold himself from the underground Communist Party; he could
not withhold himself from its participation in the decision to form
uMkhonto we Sizwe; he could not protect himself from exposure by
staying out of the Rivonia case; he could not abstain from the
131 Clingman (note 1 above) 166-67, 283.
132 When he returned to Europe for a Communist-linked 'Congress of the Peoples for Peace', he
disdained London's West End plays as 'bourgeois and neurotic', and 'it was evident that his

political and aesthetic tastes had hardened from twenty years before' (ibid 198-99).
133 Clingman comments that '[t]here is no doubt that [taking in the little girl, Nora Mlambo,] was
in many respects a remarkable gesture for those times, especially for an Afrikaner', but notes
that this act was later seen by some as 'Brain Fischer's unholy communist "experiment"' (ibid
171). Clingman suggests, however, that the Fischers acted at least as much out of their 'clear

sense of human reciprocity' as out of any political principle (ibid 171-72).
134 Ibid 226.
135 See ibid 59-60, 286-87, 375, 413, 456.
136 Ibid 424.

137 Ibid. One fellow political prisoner viewed him as rigid and Stalinist, but this man may have
been almost alone in his harsh reaction. '[Bly common consent [Fischer] was the presiding
and guiding figure in prison. Everyone came to him with their needs and their troubles, and

no decision of any import was ever taken without hearing his views' (ibid 424-25). Baruch
Hirson, a fellow prisoner and sharp critic of Fischer's Communist political thinking, wrote
that Fischer 'towered over [the prison authorities] (despite his size!) as he towered over the
political prisoners' and recalled that Fischer's 'lack of personal rancour, his even-handed
treatment of everyone, and his compassion' 'endeared Brain to everyone in the prison yard'.

B Hirson Revolutions in My Life (1995) 247. For other instances of Fischer's role in prison,
see Lewin (note 88 above) 184, 187, 215-16.
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resurrection of uMkhonto during that trial; and in the end, perhaps
impelled further by the terrible loss of his wife, he could not hold back
from following Nelson Mandela's example and going underground. 138
He broke the law out of despair, out of determination, out of self-doubt,
out of care and love, out of loyalty, and out of integrity. As he wrote to
his lawyer in response to the Johannesburg bar's court action to strike
him from the roll of advocates:
When an advocate does what I have done ... it requires an act of will to overcome his
deeply rooted respect of legality, and he takes the step only when he feels that, whatever
the consequences to himself, his political conscience no longer permits him to do
otherwise. He does it not because of a desire to be immoral, but because to act otherwise
would, for him, be immoral. 139

In this light it is possible to answer the troubling questions I raised
earlier about the morality of Fischer's actions. 140 Was Fischer's breach of
obligation worse than killing? In light of Fischer's life, this question no
longer seems so difficult. Though he violated many of his obligations
under the law, he did so out of obligation rather than out of indifference
to it. In countless ways, he honoured the bonds between people, and the
obligations of humanity; his rigorous understanding of those ties led him
to his fate. In this important sense, he always remained honest - faced
with excruciating choices, he was prepared to take steps that were illegal
and covert but only in the service of principle, in a lifelong effort to be, in
his own qualified but determined words, 'as honest as it's possible for a
human being to be'. 141
To answer the second question posed earlier, whether his conduct
undermined the meaning of the rule of law for others and for future
generations, requires more than a moral response to Fischer himself. We
know that South Africa embraced the rule of law, and in particular the
value of enforceable constitutional law, in making its remarkable
transition to democracy. We do not yet know, however, exactly how
firmly the rule of law has become ingrained in the new South Africa. In a
real sense, the lessons of Brain Fischer's life are still being learned and
138 Bernstein describes the frame of mind of the activists connected to Rivonia as arrest

approached: 'There was, I suppose, a measure of recklessness in us all, which kept us going
even while things were patently falling apart. We were living dangerously in the constant

shadow of disaster ... We had come too far and given too much to pull back now even if we
wanted to. There was only one way to go - onward.' Bernstein (note 20 above) 249.
139 Clingman (note 1 above) 369-70. This statement is not unlike a comment by Gandhi, who
wrote that a Satyagrahi, a person challenging injustice through nonviolent 'truth force',
'obeys the laws of society intelligently and of his own free will, because he considers it to be

his sacred duty to do so. It is only when a person has thus obeyed the laws of society
scrupulously that he is in a position to judge as to which particular rules are good and just
and which unjust and iniquitous. Only then does the right accrue to him of the civil
disobedience of certain laws in well-defined circumstances' (MK Gandhi An Autobiography;
or the Story of My Experiment with Truth (1957) trans M Desai (1993) 575-76, quoted in J
Leubsdorf 'Gandhi's Legal Ethics' (1999) 51 Rutgers LR 923, 939).

140 See notes 75-79 above and accompanying text.
141 See text at note 107 above.
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still being applied; their ultimate impact will be the result of what today's
and tomorrow's South African lawyers and citizens say and do.
It would be tempting to say that Fischer's decision to sacrifice his own
well-being and go underground ultimately taught respect for moral
principle and for just law, because it was, after all, a public moral witness
quite akin to civil disobedience. But this decision, as we have seen, was not
the only one Fischer made. Some people, though not many, knew he had
gone further: some of his political comrades, who might have taken his
choices as guidance for their own later decisions, and presumably some of
his adversaries within the South African security state, who might have
seen in his conduct a confirmation of the immorality of their
opponents. 142 Moreover, if others, anti-apartheid lawyers or South
African citizens, had known of his active contributions to sabotage during
the Rivonia trial, some of them might have deeply disapproved of his
lawbreaking.
On the other hand, many South African citizens - quite possibly most,
since most South Africans were black people oppressed by apartheid and
its laws - might have been impressed and moved by his bravery.
Moreover, while I have been at pains to identify those respects, until
recently not widely known, in which Fischer for the sake of conscience
breached his obligations as a lawyer, what the public did know about
Fischer was remarkable enough. Even in 1965 all of South Africa knew
that Fischer had set himself wholly against the state. He himself told the
court at his trial for sabotage that he 'had become aware of the existence
of uMkhonto after it was formed, and I did not disapprove'. 143 All of this
was enough, no doubt, to raise in others' minds, in particular in the
minds of anti-apartheid lawyers, the question of whether they too could
no longer adhere to the rules of behavior of a legal system so
compromised by injustice. 144
We simply do not know, and probably never will know, how many
South African anti-apartheid lawyers, ostensibly working within the limits
of the law, chose to violate the rules of legal practice in the course of the
struggle. We can say, however, that if Fischer's logic had been applied
relentlessly and undiscriminatingly - and not limited to the tremendously
142 Action promotes, or at least provides a cover for, reaction. Fischer himself worried about the
ANC's entry into armed struggle; Joe Slovo recalled that Fischer was 'anxious to avoid a step
from which there could be little turning back for South Africa'. Clingman (note 1 above) 285.
Cf Dyzenhaus (note 23 above) 133 (arguing that the ANC's move, however fully justified,
provided a pretext for the state's ferocious repression). It is, of course, ultimately a truism
that human encounters are interactive, and to recognise this is not at all to excuse the horrors
of the apartheid state's response to the liberation struggle.
143 Clingman (note 1 above) 414. He denied various other connections to uMkhonto, including
'any knowledge of its financial sources' (ibid), although Clingman reports that Fischer
'brought Kitson [a member of uMkhonto] money in large amounts, smuggled in from
overseas' (ibid 311).
144 David Dyzenhaus, in his thoughtful and admiring discussion of Fischer, emphasises the
challenge he posed to his colleagues (Dyzenhaus (note 23 above) 99).
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wrenching circumstances in which he himself had to act - the result would
have been legal lawbreaking on a wide scale. This lawbreaking would have
gone far beyond the limited contexts, discussed earlier in this article, in
which it is now public knowledge that lawyers broke the law. 145 By the
1980s, South Africa's legal system presented a host of occasions for antiapartheid lawyering, from work akin to American poverty legal services to
labour law to the defence of anti-apartheid activists both prominent and
obscure. In all of these settings it might have been convenient to break the
normal bounds of legal ethics for the sake of clients or (not necessarily the
same thing) for the sake of the cause.
If Fischer's choices were widely, though covertly, imitated, we would not
easily be able to say whether the result was to undermine the rule of law for
the future, or only to undermine the rule of apartheid then and there. The
ravaging injustice of apartheid pervaded South African law, yet even so its
courts ordinarily remained open and sometimes did justice in the face of
apartheid's logic. In the words of Walter Sisulu, a determined revolutionary
and no stranger to South Africa's courts, 'there is a certain amount of
justice in the judiciary.' 146 It could be that disrespect for the rules of even so
gravely flawed a legal system would teach disregard forever. 147 Like other
human behaviour, lawbreaking is, no doubt, partly a matter of habit, and a
habit once acquired as a part of ardent political struggle might find
expression in other, less admirable moments as well. On this ground, I feel
that the possibility that a part of the heritage of South Africa's antiapartheid lawyering might have been a norm of widespread lawbreaking is
a troubling one. On the other hand, men and women go to war and come
home to peace. South African lawyers, similarly, might have disregarded
the rules of ethics in a racist authoritarian state, and come home to honour
those same rules as part of a democratic order. And perhaps each of these
patterns may have held true for some South African lawyers.
My own perception, however, is that many anti-apartheid lawyers, even
in the midst of apartheid's rule, remained deeply convinced of the moral
significance and value of law. For these lawyers, Fischer's life surely did
not teach the lesson that law could be casually dispensed with in order
someday to restore law. I suspect that, just as his gentle, self-effacing style
of lawyering may have helped shape a generation of South African anti-

145 See notes 6-27 above and accompanying text.
146 Sisulu (note 28 above) 118.
147 As David Dyzenhaus observes, 'right can never be entirely on the side of one who decides to
overthrow an order which still contains vestiges of the rule of law' (Dyzenhaus (note 23
above) 134). John Leubsdorf comments that 'Gandhi never treated the existing system as a
mere power structure that lacked any legitimacy, so that revolutionaries should manipulate
or disregard it at will. He would have regarded such an attitude as fatal to the moral growth
of both the manipulators and the manipulated, and he believed that growth was essential to
any real or lasting improvement' (Leubsdorf (note 139 above) 937).
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apartheid lawyers' courtroom tactics, 148 so his decisions to violate the law
out of principle contributed to many principled lawyers' determination,
not to disregard the obligations of legal ethics, but to fight relentlessly and
courageously to overturn the world of apartheid. Whether or not lawyers
like this ever felt themselves obliged to depart from the law - not widely
and habitually but only, as Fischer did himself, in circumstances of
surpassing moral crisis 14 9 _ the lesson they brought to the new South
Africa would not have been disrespect for legal order. Rather, they would
have sought, and did seek, a Bill of Rights, as Albie Sachs writes in his
remarkable memoir, to eliminate the horrors that 'compelled the most
honest amongst us to become the biggest dissemblers'. 150
148 On Fischer's style, see Clingman (note 1 above) 116, 247, 255, 299-300. For an instance of
'unusual emotion,' see ibid 308. On Fischer's impact on other lawyers, see ibid 454-55. For an
account of the comparable style of advocacy that seems to have been characteristic at least of
many anti-apartheid South African lawyers, see Ellmann (note 76 above) 238-41.
149 Lawyers who chose not to violate the law might nevertheless have also chosen to stretch it. A
lawyer who would not knowingly lie in court, for example, might have structured his or her
inquiries of the client so as not to come to know intolerably damaging facts. I have argued
that such conduct can be justified, in limited circumstances, even in the United States, a
society whose legal system is obviously far less flawed than that of apartheid South Africa.
See S Ellmann 'Truth and Consequences' (2000) 69 Fordham LR 895, 905-09 (2000). Conduct
of this sort does stay within the bounds of the law, albeit uncomfortably within them. As
such, it may be less disrespectful and less threatening to the values of the rule of law than
blunt (and covert) disobedience.
150 Sachs (note 4 above) 208. The Johannesburg bar has come to recognise that '"a grave
injustice" was done to Fischer' when his name was taken off the roll of advocates (Dyzenhaus
(note 23 above) 99 (quoting the General Council of the Bar's submission to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission hearings on the legal profession)). His name has not been
restored to the roll. Clingman writes that the reason is that '[o]nly practising advocates may
appear on the roll; someone who is no longer alive can no longer practise; therefore Bram
could not be reinstated' (Clingman (note 1 above) 454). Surely this is a requirement that
could be made waivable, and should now be waived. Happily, Fischer's reinstatement now
appears imminent, under the Restoration of Enrolment of Certain Legal Practitioners Bill,
which has been approved by South Africa's cabinet and will be before Parliament early in
2002. W Hartley 'Bill Seeks to Reinstate the Lawyers Who Fell Victim to Apartheid' Business
Day (29 November 2001).
Candour compels the acknowledgment that Fischer had by 1965, overtly and covertly,
gone far beyond the bounds of normal legal ethics. (His actions as a lawyer in the Rivonia
trial were not then known, however, and the sole basis for his disbarment appears to have
been his breach of his bail.) See notes 63-72 above and accompanying text. A lawyer who
systematically acts on the principle that the rules of legal ethics are not binding can hardly
continue to act as a lawyer. Even so, it was not necessary to remove Fischer from the roll, for
he was already on a trajectory that would send him to prison or at the very least keep him far
from the work of legal advocacy. Moreover, the government had already announced its
intention to bar all communists, in or out of prison, from practising. See Clingman (note 1
above) 342, 369. (Nelson Mandela, imprisoned for life, was never struck from the roll of
attorneys. See Mandela (note 6 above) 426-27.) Nor, ultimately, was it just to strike Fischer
from the roll. Fischer, the moralist who turned to illegality in an immoral society, did not
deserve to be cast out as dishonourable. As his lawyer Sydney Kentridge urged in court at the
time, 'It was doubtful ... if there were any member of the Bar that had known Brain who
would be prepared to stand up and say, "He is a less honourable man than I am' (Clingman
(note 1 above) 389).
Ironically, South Africa, with its history of internal division, also had a history of
distinguishing to some extent between crimes committed out of political conviction and
crimes that made a lawyer unfit to practise law. See IncorporatedLaw Society, Transvaal v
Mandela 1954 (3) SA 102 (T) 107-09; Ex parte Krause 1905 TS 221. Fischer himself invoked
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We do, therefore, have reason to think that Fischer's actions ultimately
affirmed, rather than undercut, the rule of law in a future South Africa.
But we do not, and in fact cannot, know this with certainty. Our efforts
to calculate the ripples of someone's actions over a span of thirty years
and more must always be somewhat speculative. Fischer himself, as he
decided what to do, could not have known exactly what the results of his
choices would be. 151 In the end we must judge the rightness of actions in
part by understanding the person who took them, and all the more so
because the impacts that actions have are in part the product of the moral
quality of the person who acted. Choices recklessly and callously made
resonate differently over the years than those made with a full heart.
Fischer acted with a tremendously full heart. Others might have chosen
differently, and I do not say that Fischer's choices were necessarily the
best ones. I do say that they were the morally justified choices of a
remarkable man.
IV

CONCLUSION

Brain Fischer offered himself as a sacrifice, as Clingman emphasises. 152
In a life that initially might seem quite removed from Fischer's, and more
frivolous than his, Oscar Wilde similarly became a sacrifice. Wilde
sacrificed himself for a life of artistic and sexual freedom. Brain Fischer
may once have flirted with this version of human liberty, 153 but seems
largely to have cast it aside in favour of political earnestness. Yet the two
this distinction in his response to the Johannesburg bar's proceeding against him. See Society
of Advocates of South Africa (WitwatersrandDivision) v Fischer 1966 (1) SA 133 (0) 135H.
The precedents may not have encompassed all that we now know Fischer had done; indeed,

in one further irony, Fischer's own father was apparently the lawyer in an unsuccessful
attempt to forestall the disbarment of an Afrikaner rebel convicted of high treason
(IncorporatedLaw Society v De Villiers 1915 OPD 98). It is still sad that Fischer was not
treated with the generosity South Africa sometimes accorded its erstwhile adversaries.
151 Dyzenhaus (note 23 above) 134.
152 See Clingman (note 1 above) 456.
153 Fischer wrote to his future wife from Europe in 1932 to express, or confess, his thoughts
about sexuality: 'For me the only thing that is wrong is that which impedes the development
of intellectual life on this planet' (ibid 93). As Clingman writes, Fischer 'told Molly he had

not actually put his sexual philosophy into practice

"just why is difficult to say"' (ibid).

Molly disagreed in principle, but also pointed out in her letter back that 'You have such

'frightfully loose moral standards' and then you never do a thing to be ashamed of' (ibid 94).
Her insight reflected not only Fischer's own rectitude, but also his tendency to work for

others' well-being while almost never being able to ask for help for himself (ibid 425, 428-29).
(People often value in others what they hope to find in themselves, and Gillian Slovo observes
that Brain Fischer, mourning for his wife Molly, praised her for having 'the rare quality,

supposed to belong to judges, of being able to exclude entirely from her mind what the
consequences of a decision might be to her and what was perhaps even more remarkable
what such consequences might be to her family.' She is struck by 'that almost biblical

conviction that what matters is not the person but the cause. And yet Brain was the least
impersonal of men... He was one of the most heroic of men and the kindest and here is his
accolade for the dead wife he had adored: that she thought not of herself, or of her family,
but of others, less well off than them.' G Slovo Every Secret Thing: My Family, My Country

(1997) 99.) Both aspects of his personality helped bring him to the radical, even desperate,
steps of his last years of freedom.
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men shared lives filled with early promise, graced by personal kindness,
and drawn almost ineluctably towards terrible loss.
The routes they took towards their final suffering were not, after all,
entirely different. Fischer's choices were more political than Wilde's, but
both were certainly fuelled by deep emotion. Wilde's decision to file a
baseless libel suit against his lover's father, a suit he could only pursue
through perjury and that ultimately his perjury was insufficient to
sustain, sent him to prison at the height of his success, and cut him away
from the society that had briefly acclaimed him. It might be said that he
did all this to satisfy his vengeful lover, yet these decisions also grew out
of the fundamental impulse toward self-expression that Wilde exemplifies
even today.
Wilde's life teaches lessons of personal liberation and its costs, and his
actions do not reflect the burdens of power and responsibility that
lawyers often undertake. The sense that Wilde stood for principle even as
he violated the law, however, resonates with the life that Fischer led, and
each became an avatar of a liberation he would not live to see. Moreover,
Wilde, who was a socialist as well as an artist, may in his own way have
had a moral rigour quite comparable to Fischer's. As my father, Richard
Ellmann, wrote in the biography of Wilde he completed just before his
death:
Essentially Wilde was conducting, in the most civilized way, an anatomy of his society,
and a radical reconsideration of its ethics. He knew all the secrets and could expose all the
pretense. Along with Blake and Nietzche, he was proposing that good and evil are not
what they seem, that moral tabs cannot cope with the complexity of behavior. His
greatness as a writer is partly the result of the enlargement of sympathy which he
demanded for society's victims. 154

Wilde himself wrote, in words that describe both him and Bram Fischer,
that:
Personality is a very mysterious thing. A man cannot always be estimated by what he
does. He may keep the law and yet be worthless. He may break the law, and yet be fine.
He may be bad, without ever doing anything bad. He may commit a sin against society,
and yet realize through that sin his own perfection. 155

In writing about Brain Fischer I have tried to offer an appreciation of
Fischer akin to my father's appreciation of Oscar Wilde. It is not
necessary to agree with Brain Fischer's choices to understand that they
were moral choices. It is also not necessary to ignore the role that
personal loss or anguished self-examination played in his choices to
recognise that they were principled decisions - the kind that human,
emotional beings make. Perhaps, though, it is necessary to understand
how impressive a man Brain Fischer was in order to accept, even
154 R Ellmann Oscar Wilde (1987) xiv.
155 0 Wilde 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism' in 0 Wilde The Artist as Critic: CriticalWritings

of Oscar Wilde ed R Ellmann (1969) 255, 265.
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somewhat comfortably, the reality that if one lawyer can break the law
out of principle, so can others. We cannot stop this, and we cannot doubt
that some of the lawyers who do this will do so mistakenly or that others
will claim the mantle of principle when in fact they are merely corrupt.
We can only say that we should seek to educate our students, and to
strengthen ourselves, to live, as Bram Fischer did, with integrity, because
it is certainly true that to live justly outside the law, you must be honest.

